North Dakota Law Review
Volume 82

Number 1

Article 6

1-1-2006

Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of Law: Strict Scrutiny
Applies to All Racially Segregated Citizens, Free and Confined
Michelle Feist

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Feist, Michelle (2006) "Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of Law: Strict Scrutiny Applies to All Racially
Segregated Citizens, Free and Confined," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 82 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol82/iss1/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW:
STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES TO ALL RACIALLY
SEGREGATED CITIZENS, FREE AND CONFINED
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)
I.

FACTS

A male inmate arriving at the California Department of Corrections
(CDC), either as a transferee from another state institution or as a new
inmate, was housed in a reception center.1 The inmate could remain in the
reception center for up to sixty days depending upon how soon after his
arrival he would be transferred to permanent housing.2 During this time,
prison officials evaluated the inmate’s physical, mental, and emotional
health.3 The reception center evaluations were a method by which the CDC
determined an inmate’s ultimate placement.4
Inmate housing at the reception center was based upon a number of
factors.5 The factors included, but were not limited to, gender, age, classification score, case concerns, custody concerns, mental and physical health,
enemy situations, gang affiliation, background, history, custody designation, and race.6 Race was a predominant factor in the inmate’s placement at
the reception center.7 While at the reception center, the likelihood that an
inmate would be assigned a cellmate of another race was “‘[p]retty close’ to
zero percent.”8

1. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Reply Brief at 5, Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636), 2004 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579. Section 62010.8.3 of the Departmental Operations Manual states, “each
institution shall establish an initial classification committee to review and initiate a suitable program for each inmate within 14 days after arrival at the institution.” Id. The manual did not indicate that the inmate would be classified and placed within fourteen days, only that an initial
review of the inmate would take place within that time. Id. The policy expressly permitted the
inmates to be segregated in the reception centers for up to sixty days. Id.
3. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794.
4. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502.
5. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794.
6. Id.
7. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502; see also Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No.
03-636) (indicating that during an inmate’s initial assignment at the reception center, the prison
officials use a form which includes only the inmate’s name/prison number, security/custody level,
and ethnicity/race).
8. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502.
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The CDC’s rationale for segregating prisoners in double-celled
reception areas was to prevent racial violence caused by gangs.9 Five major
prison gangs were found in the CDC system: Mexican Mafia, Nuestra
Familia, Black Guerilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood, and Nazi Low
Riders.10 The associate warden and prison officials at the CDC believed
that prisoners would engage in racial violence if segregation had not been
enacted.11
Aside from the double-celled reception areas, the rest of the State’s
prison facilities were fully integrated.12 After the initial sixty-day period,
the inmates were allowed to select their cellmates.13 The CDC usually
granted an inmate’s request for a selected cellmate unless there was a
security concern.14
Garrison Johnson, an African-American inmate, had been in the
custody of the CDC since 1987.15 During his incarceration, Johnson was
housed at a number of California prison facilities.16 In each of the prison
facilities, Johnson was double-celled in the reception center with another
African-American inmate.17 Johnson filed his original complaint pro se on
February 24, 1995, in the district court.18 Johnson alleged that the CDC’s
reception center housing policy violated his constitutional right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by assigning his cellmates
based on race.19 Johnson alleged that former CDC Directors James
Rowland, from 1987 to 1991, and James Gomez, from 1991 until the time
Johnson filed his complaint, enforced the racial segregation policy in
reception areas of the CDC.20

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 502-03; Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794. The double cells were unlike common areas in
the prison because they provided areas of privacy for the inmates. Id. Prison officials could not
see into the double cells without physically approaching them. Id. Inmates could cover the
windows of the double cells so that vision into the cells was completely obstructed. Id.
12. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 503 (indicating that the yard, cells, and dining areas were fully
integrated).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also Joint App. at 264a, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636) (indicating that
Johnson was sentenced to the County of Los Angeles prison for twenty-five years to life for one
count of murder, and a consecutive eleven years for four counts of residential robbery and one
count of assault with a deadly weapon).
16. See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 793 (indicating that Johnson had been housed at reception
centers in four correctional facilities in California: Chino, Folsom, Calipatria, and Lancaster).
17. Id.; Joint App. at 48a, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636).
18. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 795.
19. Id.
20. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 503.
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The district court dismissed Johnson’s complaint for failing to state a
claim.21 Johnson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, finding that Johnson had
stated a claim for racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 On remand, Johnson was granted
leave to amend his complaint once counsel was appointed to him.23 The
district court granted summary judgment on Johnson’s fourth amended
complaint in favor of the prison directors on grounds that they were
qualifiedly immune because their conduct was not unconstitutional.24
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Turner v. Safley’s25
deferential standard of review to the CDC’s policy rather than applying
strict scrutiny.26 To prevail, Johnson had to prove that that the prison
officials had acted beyond their “broad discretion.”27 The Ninth Circuit
held that the CDC’s policy survived Turner’s deferential standard.28
Johnson appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, requesting a rehearing en
banc.29 The Ninth Circuit denied the rehearing.30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.31 The issue before
the Court was whether the standard of review for racially segregating
inmates should be Turner’s deferential standard or strict scrutiny.32 The
Court held that racial classifications in prisons shall be evaluated under
strict scrutiny.33
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

21. Id. at 503-04.
22. Id. at 504.
23. Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000).
24. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 504.
25. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
26. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 2003).
27. Id. at 799; see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989) (stating that prison
officials should be given “broad discretion” in disciplining inmates because of the volatile nature
of prisons).
28. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 807.
29. Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003).
30. Id.
31. Johnson v. California, 540 U.S. 1217, 1217 (2004).
32. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
33. Id. at 515.
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due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.34
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state
from applying a facially neutral law for the purpose of racially discriminating against individuals.35 Even if a state applies the law equally to
different races, the Court may find invidious discrimination.36 When laws
contain racial classifications, states must meet a heavy burden of justification, which the Fourteenth Amendment requires.37 Consequently, the Court
has consistently “repudiated ‘[d]istinctions between citizens solely because
of their ancestry.’”38
However, the Court’s repugnance of states racially discriminating
against their citizens has historically involved free citizens, and not incarcerated citizens.39 Thus, two competing lines of precedent are relevant in
determining what standard of review applies to racial discrimination against
an inmate.40 In the first line of cases, the Supreme Court held that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review when the government racially
discriminates against its citizens. 41 However, in the second line of cases,
the Supreme Court applied a deferential standard of review when determining whether prison regulations violate an inmate’s constitutional rights.42
A. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The United States Supreme Court originally took the position that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was intended only to
enforce the legal equality of races.43 However, the Court also found that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to abolish social distinctions

34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976)).
36. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 11 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
39. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (stating that racial distinctions are odious to free
people).
40. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to racial discrimination by any government entity); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987) (finding that courts should defer to the judgment of prison administrators in determining
what regulations are necessary to prevent security problems).
41. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (stating that the government must have compelling reasons
for treating its citizens differently because of their race).
42. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (stating that a penal regulation is valid so long as it is
reasonably related to penological interests).
43. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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based upon color or to enforce commingling of the races.44 In Plessy v.
Ferguson,45 the Supreme Court faced the challenge of applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to a seemingly white individual.46 Plessy, who was one-eighth African-American blood and seveneighths Caucasian blood, had violated Louisiana law by sitting in a railway
car that was designated for whites.47 The Court stated racial separation
neither denied Plessy due process of the law nor denied him equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 In
addition, the Court noted that the United States Constitution could not put
races that were considered to be socially unequal on an equal footing.49
Social equality “must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals.”50
But fifty-eight years later, in Brown v. Board of Education,51 the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that separate could ever be equal in
public schools.52 The Court determined that the clocks of time could not be
turned back to 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, nor
even to Plessy.53 Instead, the Court stated that the “separate but equal”
doctrine must be applied to public education in light of education’s present
place in American life.54 The Court held that the “separate but equal”
doctrine was unconstitutional when applied to educational facilities.55 The

44. Id.
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 548.
49. Id. at 552.
50. Id. at 551.
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
53. Id. at 492. The Court stated that the “separate but equal” doctrine had to be evaluated in
light of present circumstances, because at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption in
1868, there were inherent differences in the education levels of African American children and
white children. Id. at 490. In 1868, white children were educated in private schools. Id. African
American children were not educated; thus, most were illiterate. Id. However, the Court noted
that some African Americans at the time of Brown had been educated, excelling in the sciences
and in business. Id. The advancement of educational opportunities for African Americans between the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption and the time of Brown led the Court to
conclude that racial segregation in schools had to be evaluated in light of present conditions. Id. at
492.
54. Id. at 492-93.
55. Id. at 495. The Court found public education to be one of the most important functions
of the government because it awakens children to cultural values, offers professional training, and
helps them adjust to their environment. Id. at 493. The Court stated that segregating children by
race creates an inferiority complex in African-American children that affects their ability to learn
by limiting their mental and educational development. Id. at 494. Due to the significant and
irreversible impacts that segregation had on African-American children, the Court stated that
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Brown reasoning was extended to schools in the District of Columbia that
same year.56
The Supreme Court later adopted strict scrutiny as the standard of review for governmental implementations of racial classifications outside of
public schools.57 Since racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, the Court said, “[I]t would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”58 In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,59 the Department of Transportation (DOT)
awarded a prime contract to a general contractor, which requested bids from
subcontractors for the guardrail portion of the contract.60 Adarand, a construction company specializing in guardrail work, submitted the lowest
bid.61 Instead of hiring Adarand, the general contractor hired a construction
company that was “socially and economically disadvantaged.”62 The Small
Business Act allowed general contractors to receive additional compensation for hiring subcontractors certified as socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses.63 But the Court was not persuaded that
“benign” racial classifications, which were intended to benefit the minority
race, could be distinguished from racial classifications based on illegitimate
motives.64
The Adarand Court stated that all government actions based on race
should be evaluated under detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that one’s
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” and therefore violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 495.
56. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public
schools was an arbitrary deprivation of African-American students’ liberties).
57. Id.; see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (stating that racial gerrymandering
of political districts cannot be judicially regulated under the Equal Protection Clause, but instead
must be left to the states and Congress); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (invalidating
a state university’s undergraduate admissions program under a strict scrutiny analysis, because the
applicant was guaranteed a higher chance of acceptance merely on the basis of the applicant’s
race); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a state law school’s admissions
policy under strict scrutiny because the applicant’s race was but one of many factors considered in
the admissions process); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (invalidating a
city’s plan that apportioned public contracting duties on the basis of race, because the plan did not
meet strict scrutiny).
58. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500; see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (indicating that claims of racial discrimination by any government entity are evaluated
under strict scrutiny).
59. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
60. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205.
61. Id.
62. See id. (citing section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(2)-(3) (1958),
which provides in part that “[t]he contractor shall presume that socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities”).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 226.
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equal protection rights have not been infringed.65 Summarizing its own
precedent, the Court set forth three propositions regarding racial classifications: (1) any preference based on race or ethnicity should be evaluated
under the most searching examination; (2) the standard of review of a racial
classification is not based upon the race of the individual burdened or
benefited; and (3) the Equal Protection analysis is the same for a Fourteenth
Amendment claim as it is for a Fifth Amendment claim.66 Taking these
three propositions together, the Supreme Court in Adarand held that all
racial classifications imposed by state, local, or federal governments must
be examined under strict scrutiny.67 The Court stated, “[T]he purpose of
strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool.”68
Apart from Adarand, the Supreme Court has stated that disadvantageously treating races in the political process “inevitably raises dangers of
impermissible motivation.”69 In Washington v. Seattle School District
Number 1,70 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a state initiative that banned
mandatory busing designed to eliminate racial segregation.71 The Court
stated that governmental laws or policies designed to protect minorities or
ameliorate past racial segregation are constitutionally suspect.72 But the
Court also acknowledged that not every attempt to address racial issues
creates an impermissible racial classification.73
In sum, the Court has taken a strong stance against the government
racially discriminating against its citizens.74 The Court has applied a strict
scrutiny standard of review to any governmental racial classification, regardless of whether it benefits or burdens a minority class, to determine

65. Id. at 227; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny for racial classifications, like racial gerrymandering of
political districts for voting purposes, because racial classifications prevent society from reaching
a time when race no longer matters).
66. Adarand, 515 U.S at 223-24 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 227.
68. Id. at 226 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
69. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 n.30 (1982).
70. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
71. Washington, 458 U.S. at 485. The City of Seattle voted for the Seattle Plan, which was
designed to balance the minority ratios in racially unbalanced public schools by extensive busing
and mandatory reassignments of students. Id. at 461. In response to the Seattle Plan, a statewide
initiative was passed providing that no school board could require any student to attend a school
other than the one that is nearest to the student’s residence. Id. at 462.
72. Id. at 486-87.
73. Id. at 485.
74. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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whether it infringes on an individual’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.75 But
in those cases, the Court was evaluating the legal standard for Fourteenth
Amendment protections of a free citizen, not an inmate.76 Therefore, in
order to understand whether an inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment protection
against racial discrimination differs from that of a free citizen, it is
necessary to examine legal precedent that defines the standard of review for
determining whether an inmate’s constitutional rights have been violated.77
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
The Supreme Court has identified the unique situation presented by
prisoners in determining whether they retain the same constitutional protections as free citizens.78 As the Court stated in Pell v. Procunier,79 “[B]y
confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are isolated from the
rest of society . . . they and others will be deterred from committing
additional criminal offenses.”80 The Court further stated, “The relationship
of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise their confinement is
far more intimate than that of a State and a private citizen, and that the
‘internal problems of state prisons involve issues . . . peculiarly within state
authority and expertise.’”81 Therefore, the Court has consistently given
deference to prison administrators in determining what regulations may be
imposed on inmates to prevent violence within prison walls.82 In making
the determination that deference should be given to prison administrators,
the Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutional rights of inmates under
the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.83

75. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (stating that racial classifications must
be strictly scrutinized regardless of what race is benefited or burdened); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (stating that all racial groups should be treated
consistently).
76. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-06 (concerning a statute that offered financial incentives
for contractors to hire economically and socially disadvantaged subcontractors).
77. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968) (examining whether racially
discriminating against inmates violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
78. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (stating that
incarceration necessarily involves the loss of many rights and privileges of those detained).
79. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
80. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
81. Id. at 825-26 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973)).
82. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (stating that affairs of prison administration
are best left to prison staff, not the courts).
83. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (stating that an inmate’s Eighth
Amendment rights are violated only when an officer exhibits deliberate indifference to the
inmate); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (finding that a prison regulation that infringes on an inmate’s
constitutional rights is valid so long as it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests);
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment

Courts have a duty to alter the conditions of prisoner confinement
where cruel and unusual punishment exists.84 The Supreme Court has
stated that the criteria necessary to establish cruel and unusual punishment
vary depending on the circumstances.85 For example, when there is a
prison disturbance, such as a riot, correction officers are forced to balance
the need to restore order and discipline against the risk of causing injury to
inmates because of the force used.86 Under such a circumstance, “[p]rison
administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.”87
The standard of review for determining whether an inmate’s Eighth
Amendment rights have been violated is “deliberate indifference.”88 Under
Supreme Court precedent, an Eighth Amendment violation occurs when
prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or
safety.89 For an inmate to succeed in a deliberate indifference claim under
the Eighth Amendment, the inmate must show that the prison official acted
or failed to act despite knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to
the inmate.90 De minimis force against an inmate is excluded from the
Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment prohibition, unless the
force is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”91
While the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from displaying deliberate indifference to inmates, it does not mandate that prisons be
comfortable environments.92 The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on
prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and to use reasonable means

Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that in particularized
circumstances prison administrators may racially segregate inmates).
84. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 194 (9th Cir. 1979).
85. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992).
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
88. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
89. Id. at 843.
90. Id. at 842. If the prison officials applied force, the Court must determine “whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986));
see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745-46 (2002) (holding that qualified immunity was not a
valid defense for prison guards who used a restraining bar on an inmate as corporal punishment,
due to the Department of Justice’s repeated condemning of Alabama’s use of the restraining bar).
91. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327).
92. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
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to guarantee inmates’ safety.93 If prison officials take reasonable measures
to respond to a risk, they may be free from liability even if the risk was not
averted.94 In applying the deliberate indifference standard, the Court takes
two considerations into account: (1) the alleged deprivation by the official
must be objectively “sufficiently serious”; and (2) “only the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.”95
2.

Free Speech Protection Under the First Amendment

As in the Eighth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has taken a
deferential approach when determining whether an inmate’s free speech
rights have been violated.96 The Court has applied the Turner standard to
inmates’ First Amendment challenges.97 Under Turner, the Court stated
that government regulation of an inmate’s speech is valid when it is
reasonably related to penological interests.98
The Court has stated that an inmate loses those First Amendment rights
that are “inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.”99 An inmate’s First
Amendment associational right to join groups in prison is subject to the
reasonable considerations of prison management.100 The Supreme Court in
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.101 evaluated a claim
by a prisoner labor union that confiscating union packets violated the First
Amendment rights of prisoners.102 The Court stated that the Constitution

93. Id.
94. Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1996).
95. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)); see
Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment includes protecting inmates from the risk of violence from other inmates and
that prison officials are not immune from liability for an Eighth Amendment violation if no
reasonable prison official would have believed that the conduct was lawful); see also Conroy v.
Dingle, No. 01-1626, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20160, at *10-11 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2002)
(indicating that the presence of gangs and violence in itself does not mean that an Eighth
Amendment violation occurred).
96. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987) (stating that courts should
defer to the judgment of prison administrators when determining whether prison regulations
affecting inmates’ religious rights serve valid penological objectives).
97. Id. at 350.
98. Id. at 353; see also Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
that the confiscation of a religious book that an inmate used in practicing his religion was
reasonably related to the penological objective of preventing inmate violence, because the book
was not necessary for the practice of the inmate’s religion).
99. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
100. Id. at 132.
101. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
102. Jones, 433 U.S. at 121.
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does not require prison management to treat all prison groups the same
when differentiation is necessary to ensure safety and prevent violence.103
Therefore, prison officials may permit some inmate organizational groups,
while denying other groups that would interfere with the penological objectives of the institution.104 Prison officials are granted this discretion
because prisons are filled with “individuals who have demonstrated their
inability, or refusal, to conform their conduct to the norms demanded by a
civilized society,” so the rules within prison walls are substantially different
than those imposed on society.105
Just as it allowed the limitation of organizational groups in prisons, the
Supreme Court has also held that officials have the discretion to limit an
inmate’s attendance of religious services.106 In O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz,107 the Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment does not require sacrificing legitimate penological objectives
for inmates to attend religious services, if permitting inmate attendance
would result in high-risk situations of violence.108 The Court indicated that
two general principles guide the constitutional right to attend religious
services: (1) inmates do not forfeit all constitutional rights simply because
of conviction and incarceration in prison; and (2) lawful incarceration
necessarily and justifiably results in the withdrawal of many privileges and
rights of the inmates.109 Consequently, the Court gave deference to prison
officials to evaluate penal objectives because it is the officials who are
“charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under
examination.”110 In addition, the Court affirmed that the proper standard of
review for prison regulations that infringe on an inmate’s constitutional
rights is the “reasonableness” test.111 Turner’s reasonableness standard

103. Id. at 136.
104. Id. at 132.
105. Id. at 137 (Burger, J., concurring).
106. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).
107. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
108. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352-53. The inmates in O’Lone belonged to the Islamic faith. Id.
at 344-45. The inmates were assigned work areas, and a prison regulation forbade inmates from
leaving their workstation during the day to return to the main building. Id. at 346-47. The Islamic
weekly service was scheduled in the late afternoon on Fridays. Id. at 345. In order to attend the
religious services, the inmates would have had to leave work to return to the main building. Id. at
346.
109. Id. at 348.
110. Id. at 349 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).
111. Id. The Court paid deference to prison officials regarding an inmate’s constitutional
rights because running a prison is a “formidable” task, which requires administrators to evaluate
difficult and sensitive issues to maintain safety. Id. at 353; see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126, 135-36 (2003) (applying the Turner standard to uphold the right of penal officials to
reasonably place visitation restrictions on inmates with substance abuse violations).
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applies unless the activity for which the inmate is seeking protection is
“presumptively dangerous,” which requires more rigorous scrutiny.112
Similar to the Court’s holdings that prison officials may limit an inmate’s First Amendment rights to attend religious services and to form
organizational meetings, an inmate’s right to speak to the press may also be
limited.113 In Pell v. Procunier, the Supreme Court determined that inmates
do not have a First Amendment right of access to the press to conduct interviews.114 Acknowledging that the First Amendment guarantees provided to
a prisoner are not the same as those provided to a free citizen, prison officials may place restrictions on prisoners, providing that such restrictions are
reasonable in time, place, and manner.115 The Court noted that the central
goal of all prison institutions is the safety of the prisoners, and as a legitimate penological objective, safety may be primary to free speech rights.116
Unlike other free speech regulations, censorship of mail in prisons
involves unique constitutional concerns.117 In Procunier v. Martinez,118 an
inmate challenged the prison’s policy of censoring prison mail as a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech.119 The Supreme Court
reasoned that censorship of prison mail is unique because it implicates not
only the prisoner’s rights to free speech and protection against unjustified
governmental interference, but also the rights of those who are not prisoners.120 The governmental interests at stake in running a prison include preserving order and discipline, maintaining institutional security against
escape or unauthorized entry, and rehabilitating prisoners.121 Due to the
unique effect that censorship of mail has on individual rights, the Court
stated that the censorship must further one or more substantial governmental interests in security, order, or rehabilitation, and the censorship must
be no greater than is necessary.122

112. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 n.2. Prior to Turner, the Supreme Court applied a reasonableness standard to the issue of prison officials accommodating inmates’ religious beliefs. Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). The Court held in Cruz that the penal institution need not
provide a place of worship for every religion, but prison officials need only provide reasonable
opportunities for all inmates to exercise religious freedom under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id.
113. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974).
114. Id. at 827-28 n.6.
115. Id. at 822, 826.
116. Id. at 822-23.
117. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974).
118. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
119. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 398.
120. Id. at 409.
121. Id. at 412.
122. Id. at 413-14.
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In sum, the Supreme Court has applied a deferential standard of review
when determining whether an inmate’s First Amendment rights were violated.123 The Court has allowed prison officials to impose First Amendment
regulations that are reasonable in time, manner, and place.124 But historically, the Court has not applied such a deferential standard when assessing
whether an inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was
violated.125
3.

Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment

The Supreme Court has a long-standing policy against racial
discrimination in the administration of justice.126 In Rose v. Mitchell,127 the
Court evaluated the effects of racial discrimination in grand juries.128 The
Court stated that when racial discrimination is present in grand juries, the
indictee’s right to equal protection is comprised.129 As a result, the Court
will correct the wrong by quashing the indictment.130 Finding discrimination in judicial matters so abhorrent, the Court stated, “[E]qual protection
of the laws is something more than an abstract right. It is a command
which the State must respect, the benefits of which every person may demand . . . its safeguards extend to all—the least deserving as well as the
most virtuous.”131
The Court’s aversion for racial discrimination continued in the prison
context as well.132 In Lee v. Washington,133 the Supreme Court considered
whether a state statute that mandated racial segregation in prisons and jail
cells violated the Fourteenth Amendment.134 The Lee majority found that
the statute mandating racial segregation was unconstitutional.135 However,
in a concurring opinion, Justice Black stated that racially segregating

123. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977) (stating that
an inmate’s First Amendment associational rights mist give way to reasonable penal objectives).
124. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974).
125. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (upholding a district court decree
to delegate inmate holding cells).
126. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979).
127. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
128. Rose, 443 U.S. at 565.
129. Id. at 555.
130. Id. at 556.
131. Id. at 557 (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942)).
132. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968).
133. 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
134. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.
135. Id. at 334. The district court provided a schedule for the desegregation of Alabama’s
jails and prisons. Id. at 333. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s desegregation
schedule was permissible, thereby affirming the district court’s order. Id. at 334.
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inmates is not always a violation of inmates’ constitutional rights.136
According to Justice Black, racial tensions may be considered in particularized circumstances to properly maintain order and discipline, so long as
the prison authorities are acting in good faith.137
Similarly, in White v. Morris,138 a federal district court faced the issue
of racial segregation in prisons in light of a Consent Decree made between
prison officials and inmates.139 The district court adhered to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Lee that generally racial segregation in prisons is unconstitutional.140 However, the Court found that conditions within the prison had
worsened to such an extent that temporary cell assignments on the basis of
race were constitutional under Turner’s reasonableness test.141
4.

Turner v. Safley

The Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley established a standard for
evaluating the constitutional rights of inmates.142 In Turner, inmates
brought a class action to challenge the constitutionality of a regulation relating to inmate marriages.143 The challenged regulation allowed an inmate
to marry when two conditions were met: (1) the prison superintendent had
approved the marriage; and (2) the inmate had compelling reasons for the

136. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. 832 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
139. White, 832 F. Supp. at 1132. The prison riot that erupted was described as one of the
worst in the history of the United States. Id. at 1130. Nine prisoners and one prison official were
murdered, and many other prisoners were injured as a result of the riot. Id. The prisoners
themselves indicated that one of the reasons for the intense riot was integrated celling. Id. To end
the riot, the inmates negotiated with the prison officials to conditions in a Consent Decree. Id.
Security information and cell assignment records were destroyed, so the warden made cell
assignments on the basis of race to alleviate the racial tension and to preserve security within the
prison. Id. at 1131. The inmates brought a lawsuit on grounds that cell assignments on the basis
of race violated the Consent Decree. Id. The Consent Decree provided that cell assignments on
the basis of race could only be made on a written finding by the approval of the warden that an
inmate “harbors such racial hostility or animosity that he cannot be placed in an integrated cell
without a risk of violence.” Id.
140. Id. at 1132.
141. Id. at 1137.
142. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230
(2001) (applying Turner’s four-part test to the issue of whether inmates had a First Amendment
right to provide legal assistance to other inmates); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-62 (1996)
(applying Turner’s deferential standard to determine whether the prisoners’ access to law libraries
was inadequate); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (indicating that the
constitutionality of regulations affecting the sending of a publication to an inmate must be
evaluated under Turner); Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Turner to
the issue of racial segregation of prison jobs upon prison lockdowns); Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d
506, 521 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying Turner to the issue of whether segregating and separating
inmates belonging to religious associational groups was constitutional).
143. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
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marriage.144 To determine the standard of review for the regulation, the
Court evaluated four prior decisions involving inmate rights.145 The Court
held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”146
The Court combined factors from Pell v. Procunier, Bell v. Wolfish,147
Block v. Rutherford,148 and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor
Union, Inc. to establish Turner’s four-part test.149 The first factor of the test
requires that there be a “‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
it.”150 The correlation between the prison regulation and the goal cannot be
so remote that the correlation is rendered arbitrary or irrational.151 In
addition, the government’s purpose must be legitimate and neutral.152 The
second factor of the Turner test is whether inmates can exercise their
asserted rights through alternative means.153 The third factor is the impact
that the inmate’s asserted constitutional right would have on guards, other
inmates, and the allocation of resources.154 In other words, courts must
examine what ramifications would result in the prison if prison officials
were forced to recognize the asserted right of the inmate.155 The Turner
Court acknowledged that when the asserted right would have a “ripple
effect” on other inmates and prison staff, then great deference ought to be
given to prison officials.156 The fourth factor of the Turner test is whether
there is an absence of immediate alternatives.157 The Court stressed that

144. Id. at 82.
145. Id. at 86-87 (evaluating the constitutionality of prisoner rights based on Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 577 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979); Jones v. N.C.
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 119 (1977); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 817
(1974)). The Court did not apply heightened scrutiny in any of these cases. Id. at 87. In each of
these cases, the Court held that the prison regulation must be reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives. Id.
146. Id. at 89.
147. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
148. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
150. Id. (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 586).
151. Id. at 89-90.
152. Id. at 90.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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where there is an absence of appropriate alternatives, the prison regulation
is reasonable.158
The Turner Court applied the four factors to determine whether
correctional officials could ban the marriage of an inmate when supervisory
approval had not been granted.159 The Court stated that an inmate’s right to
marry is not absolute, but rather is subject to restrictions that are consistent
with legitimate penological objectives.160 On the other hand, the Court
noted the significance of marriage as an expression of religious faith,
emotional support, and public commitment for the inmate.161 The Court
determined that these personal and religious effects of marriage did not
impinge on the legitimate goals of the penal institution.162
Applying the four-part test to the marriage regulation, the Court found
the regulation facially invalid.163 First, there were no legitimate penological
concerns regarding the regulation’s restriction on inmate marriage that
would require the approval of a supervisor.164 Instead, the restriction
represented an exaggerated response by prison officials.165 Second, there
were ready alternatives that would impose a “de minimis burden on the
pursuit of security objectives.”166 Third, the corrections officers’ assertion
that inmate marriages might lead to “love triangles” was unfounded because
these feelings were likely to form with or without marriage.167 The right to
marry would not create a “ripple effect” because an inmate’s choice to
marry is private.168 Fourth, the regulation was not reasonably related to the
legitimate goal of rehabilitating the inmate.169 Consequently, by applying
the four-part test, the Court affirmatively established that a reasonableness
standard of review is to be used when evaluating regulations restricting the
constitutional rights of inmates.170

158. Id.
159. Id. at 97-98.
160. Id. at 95.
161. Id. at 95-96.
162. Id. at 96.
163. Id. at 99-100.
164. Id. at 97. The Court noted that the regulation was not reasonably related to the prison
administration’s concerns that inmate marriages would result in “love triangles” and would hinder
the inmates’ rehabilitation. Id.
165. Id. at 97-98. The Court stated that the prison could implement reasonable restrictions
on the inmate marriages that pose security concerns. Id.
166. Id. at 98 (italics added).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 89.
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C. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has historically taken a strong stance against the
government’s use of racial discrimination.171 The Court has consistently
upheld a strict scrutiny standard because of the pernicious effect that racial
discrimination has on its citizens.172 Furthermore, the Court stated in
Adarand that racial discrimination by any government agency induces the
strict scrutiny standard of review.173 However, the Court took this ardent
approach to the racial discrimination of free citizens, with no mention as to
whether it also applied to inmates.174
When the Supreme Court has been faced with determining which
standard of review to apply to alleged constitutional violations of inmates’
rights, the Court has generally deferred to the judgment of prison
administrators.175 In light of the dangerous and complex nature of prisons,
the Court has maintained that prison officials are best equipped to
determine how to run the institutions.176 Therefore, the Court has granted
deference to prison administrators, applying either Turner’s reasonableness
standard or a more deferential standard to Eighth Amendment claims when
considering the constitutional rights of inmates.177 But the Turner Court
did not state whether the reasonableness standard of review applies to all
constitutional challenges by an inmate or to only those challenges where an
inmate’s rights are inconsistent with penal objectives.178 Therefore, the
Court had to resolve this issue in Johnson v. California179 by determining
whether Turner’s reasonableness standard or Adarand’s strict scrutiny
standard applied to Fourteenth Amendment claims of racial discrimination
against inmates.
III. ANALYSIS
In Johnson v. California, Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion of the
Court, in which Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and

171. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
172. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
173. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
174. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (stating that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality”).
175. See Turner v. Safley 482 U.S. 78, 84-89 (1987) (examining the Court’s role in deferring
to prison administrators when determining whether the constitutional rights of inmates have been
violated).
176. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987).
177. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003).
178. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
179. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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Justice Breyer joined.180 The majority held that strict scrutiny is the proper
standard of review for an equal protection challenge to the policy of racially
segregating prisoners in double-celled reception centers.181 Justice
Ginsburg filed a separate concurrence, in which Justice Souter and Justice
Breyer joined.182 Justice Stevens dissented.183 Justice Thomas filed a
separate dissent, in which Justice Scalia joined.184 Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not take part in the decision.185
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court was faced with the issue of determining what standard of
review to apply to the CDC’s policy.186 The CDC’s policy allowed California prisons to racially segregate all male inmates for the first sixty days
upon their arrival.187 The Court found that Turner’s deferential standard
was inapplicable to racial classifications in prisons.188
1.

Turner Is Inapplicable to Racial Segregation

The Court noted that it has never applied Turner’s deferential standard
to issues of racial segregation.189 Rather, the Court has applied “Turner’s
reasonable-relationship test only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper
incarceration.’”190 The Court observed that it has consistently applied the
Turner reasonableness standard to inmates’ First Amendment challenges.191
While the Turner standard is applicable in First Amendment contexts,
the same is not true for the Fourteenth Amendment.192 The Court noted a
distinct difference between the preservation of an inmate’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights and First Amendment rights.193 An inmate’s First
180. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 501.
181. Id. at 515.
182. Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 501 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 505.
187. Id. at 502.
188. Id. at 509.
189. Id. at 510.
190. Id. (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)). The Court noted that the
Turner reasonableness standard does not disturb the ruling in Lee. Id. (citing Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)).
191. Id. (citing to Turner’s application in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (2003);
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 (2001); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996);
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225
(1990); and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1987)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 510-11.
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Amendment right to free speech can be compromised to further penal
objectives, but the same cannot be said for an inmate’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from racial discrimination.194 “[C]ompliance
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not only
consistent with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.”195 Historically, the Court has
recognized the pernicious nature of racial discrimination, particularly in
administering justice.196 “When government officials are permitted to use
race as a proxy for gang membership and violence without demonstrating a
compelling government interest and proving that their means are narrowly
tailored, society as a whole suffers.”197 Since the government’s power is at
its apex in the prison context, a heightened standard of review of racial
classifications is needed to prevent invidious discrimination.198
Apart from Fourteenth Amendment challenges, the Court has also not
applied Turner to Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment”
challenges.199 Instead, the Court has applied a deliberate indifference standard to determine whether an inmate has been subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment within the penal institution.200 The Court found a
similarity between Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges, such that Turner should not be applied to either challenge.201
2. The Application of Strict Scrutiny Would Not Handcuff Prison
Administrators from Maintaining Security
The CDC argued that deference to prison officials necessarily required
the application of a deferential standard to its segregation policy.202 But the
Court has not deferred to officials’ judgment on race in other areas, such as
peremptory challenges or redistricting electoral districts.203 The Court reasoned that it applied strict scrutiny to the racial segregation of inmates in

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 511 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
8 (1992); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)).
201. Id. The Court observed that both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations affect
the integrity of the criminal justice system. Id.
202. Id. at 512. The CDC argued that deference to prison officials was necessary in judicial
matters because of the difficult task of operating prisons. Id.
203. Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
89-96 (1986)).
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Lee instead of applying a relaxed judicial standard.204 The Court found it
necessary to adhere to Lee as precedent, and therefore it reaffirmed Lee’s
ruling.205 “The ‘necessities of prison security and discipline,’ are a compelling government interest justifying only those uses of race that are
narrowly tailored to address those necessities.”206
The Court maintained that strict scrutiny would not handcuff officials
from preventing racial violence in prisons.207 Strict scrutiny does not prevent prison officials from addressing issues of prison security.208 Instead,
strict scrutiny requires that the policies be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.209
3.

Disputing Justice Thomas’s Opinion

The Court disagreed with Justice Thomas’s opinion that race-based
policies should be evaluated under a deferential standard, subject to the
judgment of prison officials.210 The Court noted that the Turner standard is
too lenient to prevent invidious instances of racial discrimination.211
Furthermore, the Court postulated that the Turner standard would allow
prison officials to discriminate on the basis of race when race neutral
alternatives were available.212 Justice Thomas’s application of the Turner
standard would allow prison officials to segregate visiting areas on the basis
that social unrest could be caused by racial mixing.213 “Under Turner,
‘[t]he prisoner would have to prove that there would not be a riot.’”214 The
Court stated that under Justice Thomas’s approach, there would be no limit
as to when prison officials may discriminate on the basis of race.215
Therefore, the Court rejected the Turner standard because even “rank
discrimination” could be permitted.216

204. Id. (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)).
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (citation omitted)).
207. Id. at 514.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 513.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting)).
215. Id. at 514.
216. Id.
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Application of Strict Scrutiny to the CDC Policy

Ultimately, the Court held that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of
review for racial classifications in prisons.217 The Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s application of Turner, and remanded the case for a determination
of the constitutionality of the CDC’s policy under strict scrutiny.218 The
Court noted that the application of strict scrutiny does not mean that a racial
policy is automatically unconstitutional.219 Rather, the Court stated that because of the dangerous nature of prisons, racial classifications may be
constitutional in some contexts.220 Therefore, in Johnson, the Court established the strict scrutiny standard of review for racially classifying inmates
in prisons, but it did not make a judgment as to whether the CDC policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.221 On
remand, the CDC will have to prove that its policy of racially segregating
inmates is narrowly tailored to meet a significant government interest in
order to succeed.222
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S CONCURRENCE, JOINED BY JUSTICE SOUTER
AND JUSTICE BREYER
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court’s decision to apply strict
scrutiny to the CDC regulation.223 However, she argued that strict scrutiny
should not apply to “every official race classification.”224 Justice Ginsburg
suggested that racial classifications benefiting a suppressed class should not
be held to the strict scrutiny standard.225
C. JUSTICE STEVENS’S DISSENT
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court’s refusal to determine whether
the CDC’s policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.226 He argued that the CDC’s policy of segregating inmates
within the first sixty days of arriving at a California penal institution violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the CDC did not provide enough
evidence to justify the segregation policy even under a minimal level of
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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scrutiny.227 He stated that the CDC made no showing that housing inmates
of different races together created an unacceptable risk.228 Justice Stevens
argued that the CDC’s policy was too broad because it applied to all newly
admitted inmates, regardless of the inmates’ proclivity to racial violence.229
In addition, Justice Stevens did not give much weight to the testimony of
two CDC employees who testified to the necessary nature of the segregative
policy.230 However, he cited, with approval, the opinions of six former
state correctional officials that a blanket policy of even temporary racial
segregation runs counter to sound prison management.231
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that there was only a tenuous relationship between gang violence and the CDC’s segregation policy.232 He
stated that the CDC failed to show specific instances of interracial violence
among cellmates.233 Justice Stevens observed that the CDC failed to show
that inmates from the general population recruit newly arrived inmates into
gangs during the first sixty days.234 In addition, the CDC failed to prove
that racial violence in the common areas was a result of newly admitted
inmates.235 Justice Stevens proffered race neutral alternatives to the CDC
policy, such as individually assessing each inmate’s risk of violence at the
time of assigning him a cell.236 An inmate’s risk of violence could be
determined by examining his file, which includes records from county jails
or other penal institutions that detail the inmate’s racial violence history and
gang affiliation.237
Since a transferred inmate’s file contains information regarding his
gang affiliation and history, Justice Stevens found it relevant that a high
percentage of inmates living in the reception centers were transferees from
another state institution.238 According to Justice Stevens, the transferees
were unlike newly admitted inmates because the transferees’ records could
easily be obtained and reviewed by prison staff without subjecting the
transferee to segregation.239 He observed that the CDC rarely reviewed the
227. Id. at 517-18.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 518.
230. Id. at 518-19.
231. Id. at 519.
232. Id. at 520.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 520-21.
236. Id. at 521.
237. Id.
238. Id. Justice Stevens observed that eighty-five percent of the inmates housed in reception
centers were transferred from another correctional facility. Id.
239. Id. at 522-23.
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transferees’ records in assigning inmates to reception cells.240 Justice
Stevens suggested that the CDC policy was unconstitutional regardless of
the standard of review because the CDC did not make a good-faith effort to
transfer an inmate’s file in a timely fashion.241 Finally, Justice Stevens
argued that race is an unreliable predictor of violence because assigning
individuals of different races who are members of rival gangs might lead to
violence, as would assigning individuals of like races and rival gangs.242
D. JUSTICE THOMAS’S DISSENT, JOINED BY JUSTICE SCALIA
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that two issues were
presented in the case: (1) whether “all racial classifications reviewable
under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized”; and (2)
whether Turner’s deferential standard “applies to all circumstances in
which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”243
Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to
racially discriminatory policies in prisons.244 He noted the dangerous
nature of California prisons as a “breeding ground for some of the most
violent prison gangs in America.”245 Furthermore, he argued that the
CDC’s policy was established out of a concern for the protection and safety
of inmates’ lives.246
Justice Thomas argued that an examination of the legal issue in
Johnson required more than simply an evaluation of precedent.247 In
addition to examining legal precedent, he reasoned that the factual
background of the CDC policy should be evaluated in light of prison life
within the CDC facilities.248 Justice Thomas looked to the level of violence
in prisons, the effects of gangs, the nature of the CDC restriction, and the
safety of prison administrators and other inmates in determining which
standard of review should apply.

240. Id. at 522. The CDC’s explanation for not reviewing the transferees’ records prior to
assigning inmates to reception cells was that these records frequently did not accompany the
inmate. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 523.
243. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270
(2003) (emphasis added); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (emphasis added)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 525.
248. Id.
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Overview of the Reception Centers

Justice Thomas noted that prison officials at the reception centers
generally had little background information on a newly arrived inmate.249
He suggested that the sixty-day reception period was necessary to evaluate
an inmate’s physical, emotional, and mental health, as well as to review an
inmate’s criminal history, jail record, and enemy listings to determine the
inmate’s ultimate housing.250 Justice Thomas argued that this individual
inmate evaluation had “nothing to do with race.”251
In support of this assertion, Justice Thomas observed that not every
inmate was racially segregated during the sixty-day interview process.252
Three housing options were available for an inmate upon arriving at a CDC
facility, depending on the security threat of the inmate.253 The highest risk
inmates, those who either were an immediate security threat or needed
protective custody, were housed in single cells.254 Minimal risk inmates
were placed in dormitories on a random basis, and the dorm assignments
were not based on race.255 Justice Thomas argued that assignment to either
a single cell or the dormitory had nothing to do with race.256 However, race
was taken into account in the room assignments of double cells because
racial violence in double cells was higher than in public areas.257
2.

Housing Assignments

Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued that race was but one of many
factors that were considered in the placement of the inmates in reception
centers.258 He reasoned that inmates were separated from inmates of other
geographical or national origins to prevent gang violence.259 In addition,
inmates were separated by age, mental health, medical needs, criminal
history, and gang affiliation.260 To fully illustrate his argument, Justice
Thomas cited Johnson as an example: Johnson was a member of the Crips,

249. Id.
250. Id. at 525-26.
251. Id. at 526.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 526-27. Justice Thomas argued that racial violence in double cells was so high
because prison officials could not see into the cells without going into them, and inmates could
cover the windows to prevent staff from looking into the cells. Id. at 527.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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a black street gang, when he was originally admitted to the CDC in 1987, so
he was not housed with members of a different race.261
Justice Thomas argued that the CDC did not absolutely bar interracially
celling inmates in the reception centers.262 For example, a Hispanic inmate
who was a member of the Crips asked to be assigned a black cellmate, and
the CDC granted the inmate’s request.263 But Justice Thomas noted that
Johnson never requested a cellmate of a different race.264
3.

Justice Thomas’s Application of Turner

Turning to the issue of the proper standard of review, Justice Thomas
argued that even prior to Turner, the Court had historically given great deference to prison administrators in matters governing inmate rights.265 But
the ruling in “Turner made clear that a deferential standard of review would
apply across-the-board to inmates’ constitutional challenges to prison
policies.”266 Following Turner’s ruling, the Court has applied the deferential standard to a variety of constitutional cases, regardless of which
standard of review would have applied.267 Further, he quoted the Turner
Court: “Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to
anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration.”268
According to Justice Thomas, the Court did not consider the reality of
prison life in determining the standard of review.269 Justice Thomas stated
that controlling prison gangs is a central concern for California wardens and
guards.270 He noted that prison gangs are difficult to control because the
gangs are highly sophisticated and regimented organizations.271 Gang
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 528.
265. Id. at 529.
266. Id. at 530.
267. See id. at 530-31 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990)) (applying
Turner’s reasonableness test to the issue of forcing medication on an inmate with a serious mental
illness because trained medical specialists, and not judges, are in the best position to determine
whether an inmate should be forcibly medicated).
268. Id. at 531 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
269. Id. at 532.
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing DIV. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN
C ALIFORNIA A NNUAL REPORT TO THE C ALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 15 (2003), available at
http://caag.state.ca.us/publications/org_crime.pdf; Johnathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and
the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years (1962-1987), 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 41, 55-56 (1987)).
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activity is especially problematic in California prisons because the State
has the largest gang-related activity by inmates, with five major gangs in
the CDC.272
In light of these facts, Justice Thomas determined that the CDC’s
policy met the Turner standard.273 First, he argued that the CDC policy was
reasonably related to protecting inmates from violence, which is a legitimate penological interest.274 Notably, Johnson himself admitted that he
feared racial violence simply because of the color of his skin.275 Justice
Thomas reasoned that the CDC policy protected inmates from racial
violence by other inmates during the crucial time when prison officials were
gathering information on an inmate’s background.276 Even Johnson admitted that it would be constitutional for race to be one of the factors in
considering cell assignments.277 Here, Justice Thomas argued that race was
but one factor out of many taken into account under the CDC policy.278
Second, Justice Thomas noted that every other area of the prison was
integrated, so double-celled inmates were segregated only during the brief
period of time spent in the reception area.279 Third, he argued that Johnson
failed to prove that alternative housing would not have an adverse effect on
inmates and prison staff.280 Justice Thomas postulated that limited prison
staff, closed cells, and the prevalence of violence in cells could make it
difficult for prison administration to respond effectively to gang violence.281
He noted that racial violence would create the “ripple effect” that Turner
tried to prevent with its standard of deference to prison officials.282
Fourth, Justice Thomas stated that Johnson did not prove that easy,
ready alternatives existed to the CDC’s policy.283 Justice Thomas conceded
that inmates who were transferred from one facility to another had records
detailing their classification.284 However, he argued that integrating these
transferees was not necessarily an alternative, because an inmate who had
been well-behaved in a prison where few gang members were present might

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 538.
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be a different threat when transferred to a facility containing more gang
members.285
According to Justice Thomas, the Court in Lee did not address the level
of judicial scrutiny for racial segregation in prisons.286 The discrepancy he
found in applying Lee to racial segregation in prisons was that the Lee
Court affirmed the desegregation of Alabama prisons and jails, but still
permitted racially segregated cells “for the necessities of prison security and
discipline.”287 Justice Thomas reasoned that even if Lee had established a
standard of review, it would have also provided an exception for prison
security and discipline.288 He quoted the Lee Court for the proposition that
“prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized
circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security,
discipline, and good order in prisons and jails.”289 Justice Thomas argued
that CDC’s segregation policy would “fall squarely within Lee’ s
exception.”290
Moreover, Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that
general racial classification cases pertain to prisons.291 He noted that
Turner does not apply strictly to prisoner rights that are “inconsistent with
proper incarceration” because such an application merely begs the
question.292 In order to determine whether prisoners’ rights are inconsistent
with proper incarceration, Justice Thomas argued that it must be known
how a proper prison is run.293 But he noted that it would be inherently
problematic for courts to decide what a proper prison looks like because
Turner precisely left such judgments to prison administration.294 Therefore,
Justice Thomas argued that the Court’s ruling eviscerated Turner because
the Court, and not prison administration, has determined how best to run the
Nation’s prisons.295

285. Id.
286. Id. at 539. Justice Thomas noted that the opinion in Lee was a one-paragraph per
curiam opinion, which affirmed the district court’s decision to desegregate the Alabama jail and
prison cells. Id. He argued that the opinion found “unexceptionable” that total segregation was
unconstitutional, but segregation was constitutional when necessary to enforce prison security and
discipline. Id. Therefore, Justice Thomas argued that Lee did not say what standard of review
applies to racially segregating inmates. Id. at 540.
287. Id. at 539.
288. Id. at 540.
289. Id. (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (emphasis added)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 541.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 541-42.
294. Id. at 542.
295. Id.
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Furthermore, Justice Thomas attempted to discredit the Court’s
evidence of increased violence in racially segregated cells.296 He argued
that the sole source of the Court’s evidence was one Texas prison study.297
However, Justice Thomas noted that both Texas and California segregated
inmates during the initial transfers of inmates.298 Therefore, he reasoned
that “the study says nothing about the violence likely to result from
integrating cells when inmates are thrown together for brief periods during
admittance or transfer.”299 According to Justice Thomas, the study showed
only that once prison officials have obtained information on an inmate’s
history and criminal background, integrated housing is preferred.300 But
Justice Thomas argued that California followed this method because the
State, upon conducting a background search, allowed inmates to select
roommates.301 Finally, he observed that even states with less severe instances of racial violence found that California’s policies were necessary to
control the problems of racial violence in prisons.302
Noting additional discrepancies with the Court’s reasoning, Justice
Thomas disputed the Court’s interpretation of the standard of review for
Eighth Amendment issues.303 He argued that the Court’s reliance on the
Eighth Amendment standard of review as an exception to Turner was
misplaced.304 According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s “deliberate
indifference” standard of review for Eighth Amendment cases permits even
greater deference to prison administrators than would the application of the
Turner standard.305 Therefore, Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s
reasoning was weakened because the Eighth Amendment exception did not
impose a heightened standard to Turner.306
Turning to the facts at hand, Justice Thomas postulated that it was
possible, and even likely, that the CDC policy would meet strict scrutiny.307

296. Id. at 542-43.
297. Id. at 543 n.11.
298. Id. at 543.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 545 (citing Brief of the State of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636)) (indicating that eight states support a Turner
reasonableness standard regarding inmates’ constitutional rights, even when the asserted claim
involves a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, such as racially segregating prison
cells).
303. Id. at 546.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 547.
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The State of California has a compelling interest to maintain security in its
prisons.308 Justice Thomas stated that it would be a “Pyrrhic victory” if the
CDC policy did not survive strict scrutiny.309
Overall, Justice Thomas adhered to the reasoning of Turner in his
opinion.310 He recognized the Court’s long-held stance that prisoners do
not retain the same level of constitutional rights that free citizens do.311
Justice Thomas argued that the racially discriminatory effect of the CDC
policy resulted in saving the lives of inmates, wardens, and guards, which
outweighed any inmate indignation and stigmatization.312 Therefore,
Justice Thomas adhered to California’s position that racially segregating
inmates in reception cells was necessary.313 Justice Thomas ultimately
followed the Court’s reasoning in Turner, concluding that deference should
be given to prison administrators because they, not the Court, are best
equipped to determine how to preserve safety and discipline in prisons.314
IV. IMPACT
It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson will
have an impact outside of its limited facts.315 Supporters of civil rights
have commended the ruling.316 But others have noted that in the civil rights
battle between the State and Johnson, the Court was perceived as shutting
out the State and favoring the inmate defendant.317 Aside from commentators and supporters acknowledging the Johnson ruling, federal courts have
recognized it as well.318

308. Id. at 547-48.
309. Id. at 550. Justice Thomas noted that in the seventeen years that Johnson has been in
the California prison system, for sixteen of those years, Johnson chose to live with a black
cellmate. Id.
310. Id. at 534.
311. Id. at 524.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 542.
315. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Civil Rights Victory for Prisoners, TRIAL, May 2005, at 76.
316. Id.
317. Paul M. Rashkind, Prosecution Nearly Shut Out in Third Quarter, C RIM . JUST.,
Summer 2005, at 56.
318. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005) (following
Johnson’s ruling that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review when the government racially
discriminates against its citizens).
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A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM LOWER COURTS
Federal courts have not only cited to Johnson, but the First Circuit has
followed its ruling.319 In Comfort v. Lynn School Committee,320 the First
Circuit evaluated a Massachusetts plan to racially diversify its public
schools.321 The plan allowed students to attend the public schools that were
in their neighborhood, but if the students wished to transfer schools, automatic admittance was not granted.322 Race was a primary factor in
determining whether a student could transfer schools.323 In adhering to
Johnson’s ruling that racial classifications must be evaluated under a strict
scrutiny standard of review, the Court found the plan constitutional.324
Likewise, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits cited to Johnson in cases
involving First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.325 The
dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White326 referred to Johnson to
illustrate that the underinclusiveness of a policy would not negate its
interest as compelling, but would cast doubt on its genuineness.327 In
Western Paving Co. v. Washington State Department of Transportation,328
the Ninth Circuit cited to Johnson to indicate that the state has the burden of
proving that its race-based policies are justified.329
In addition, federal district courts across the country have cited to
Johnson in cases involving the constitutional rights of inmates.330 The

319. Id.
320. 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
321. Comfort, 418 F.3d at 5.
322. Id. at 6.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 21.
325. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 776 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Stevens’ dissent in Johnson that the failure of the acting party to
address the compelling interest, such as the CDC failing to demand pre-sentence reports and
prison records of transferred inmates in a timely fashion, casts doubt on whether the acting party is
sincere); Means v. Navajo Nation, No. 01-17489, 2005 WL 3370585, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 13,
2005) (citing to Johnson to distinguish the preferential hiring of Indians at the Bureau of Indian
Affairs from racial discrimination); Doe v. Kamehameha Sch., 416 F.3d 1025, 1042 (9th Cir.
2005) (citing to Johnson to affirm that racially discriminatory programs, even those which benefit
a burdened race, may actually perpetuate racism); W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of
Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing to Johnson for the proposition that all racial
classifications require strict scrutiny and it is up to the government to show that its policies are
justified).
326. 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
327. Republican Party of Minn., 416 F.3d at 776.
328. 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005).
329. W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 990.
330. See Farmer v. Dormire, No. 03-4180-CV-C-NKL, 2005 WL 2372146, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 27, 2005) (citing to Johnson for the proposition that an inmate retains only those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives); Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1409-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (citing
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court in Parker v. Kramer331 adhered to Johnson’s ruling and applied strict
scrutiny to a warden’s practice of ethnically separating inmates during
riots.332 The courts in Worthen v. Hull333 and Scott v. Quigley334 did not
apply Turner’s reasonably related standard of review to Eighth Amendment
rights because of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson. 335
In
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft,336 the court cited to Johnson in evaluating whether
racial discrimination occurred against inmates who were charged with the
involvement in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.337
B. NORTH DAKOTA
Unlike other courts that have already recognized Johnson’s ruling, the
impact of the ruling in North Dakota courts and prisons is uncertain.338
North Dakota has recognized three major considerations in weighing the
constitutional rights of the inmate: (1) the inmate does not forfeit all constitutional rights by reason of incarceration; (2) the constitutional rights that
the inmate retains while incarcerated are restricted; and (3) it is essential in
penal institutions that institutional security and the preservation of order
and discipline are maintained.339
to Johnson for the proposition that all racial classifications by a government require evaluation
under strict scrutiny); Parker v. Kramer, No. CVF-025117AWIDLBP, 2005 WL 2089802, at *5
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2005) (indicating that the government must meet the burden of strict scrutiny
in a racial discrimination claim by an inmate); Worthen v. Hull, No. CIV-04-976-W, 2005 WL
1950250, at *4 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2005) (citing to Johnson to indicate that the Turner
reasonableness standard does not apply to all constitutional claims by a prisoner); Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S Dist. LEXIS 8878, at *16 (N.D. Cal. May 10,
2005) (citing to Johnson for the proposition that the Turner reasonableness standard does not
apply to Eighth Amendment claims by a prisoner); Parker v. Kramer, No. CVF025117AWIDLBP,
2005 WL 1343853, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2005) (stating that the government must meet the
strict scrutiny burden such that its policy is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest).
331. No. CVF025117AWIDLBP, 2005 WL 1343853 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2005).
332. Parker, 2005 WL 1343853, at *7.
333. No. CIV-04-976-W, 2005 WL 1950250 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2005).
334. No. 3:03-CV-768, 2005 WL 1377839 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2005).
335. Worthen, 2005 WL 1950250, at *4; Scott, 2005 WL 1377839, at *2.
336. No. 04 CV-1409-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
337. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *28.
338. See Brief for the State of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21,
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636) (indicating that the racial violence in no
two prisons is the same, so there is no single rule to apply to all prisons nationwide).
339. Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796, 797-98 (N.D. 1982). The court stated that prison
officials must have the discretion to take appropriate action in prisons to ensure the safety of
inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent the escape or unauthorized entry of the inmates.
Id. at 798; see Little v. Graff, 507 N.W.2d 55, 58-59 (N.D. 1993) (indicating that the warden of
the State Penitentiary has the power to transfer inmates from one penal institution to another for
reasons of safety, discipline, medical care, and welfare of other inmates); Jensen v. Powers, 472
N.W.2d 223, 225-26 (N.D. 1991) (stating that depriving a prisoner of privileges, such as the use of
a television or a computer, is not a violation of an inmate’s rights).
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To determine whether racially segregating inmates infringes upon an
inmate’s constitutional rights, North Dakota may look to the Inmate Handbook.340 In Ennis v. Schuetzle,341 the North Dakota Supreme Court referred
to the text of the state’s Inmate Handbook to determine whether revoking
an inmate’s housing status was the loss of a right or privilege.342 The
Handbook provides that an inmate has no “implied right or expectation to
be housed in any particular unit . . . .”343 The Ennis court determined that
revoking preferential housing does not infringe on the rights of an inmate
because the inmate simply lost a privilege, not a right.344 “Deprivation of a
prisoner’s privileges does not infringe on any recognized right of a prison
inmate.”345 But the Ennis ruling does not indicate under what conditions
housing assignments involve the loss of a right, so its effect on racially
segregating inmates is unknown.346
In addition to North Dakota’s Inmate Handbook, the North Dakota
Century Code provides further guidance as to whether racially segregated
housing assignments infringe upon a prisoner’s constitutional right to equal
protection.347 The Century Code defines the rights of inmates, stating in
part, “Subject to reasonable safety, security, discipline, and correctional
facility administration requirements, the administrator of each correctional
facility shall: . . . Ensure that inmates are not subjected to discrimination
based on race, national origin, color, creed, sex, economic status, or
political belief . . . .”348 However, the North Dakota Century Code also
details the warden’s duty to maintain order in the penitentiary: “All
necessary means shall be used, under the discretion of the warden, to
maintain order in the penitentiary, enforce obedience, suppress
insurrections, and prevent escapes.”349
Although the Century Code defines an inmate’s rights, North Dakota
courts have applied Turner’s reasonableness standard to determine whether

340. See Ennis v. Schuetzle, 488 N.W.2d 867, 871 n.3 (N.D. 1992) (citing to the NORTH
DAKOTA INMATE HANDBOOK to determine whether the loss of preferential housing is a violation
of an inmate’s rights).
341. 488 N.W.2d 867 (N.D. 1992).
342. Ennis, 488 N.W.2d at 871 n.3 (citing N.D. INMATE HANDBOOK 3 (1990) (stating that
housing assignments are made at the administration’s discretion and inmates are subject to being
transferred at any time by administration)).
343. Id. (quoting N.D. INMATE HANDBOOK at 3).
344. Id. at 871.
345. Id. (quoting Jensen v. Powers, 472 N.W.2d 223, 225 (N.D. 1991)).
346. Id.
347. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44.1-14 (2005) (defining the rights of inmates).
348. Id.
349. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-47-23 (2005).
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the rights were violated.350 In State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel,351 the North
Dakota Supreme Court applied the Turner standard to the issue of whether
the act of forcibly medicating an inmate violated his constitutional rights.352
The Court stated that the “proper standard for determining the validity of a
prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is
whether the regulation is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.’”353
Looking at North Dakota law, there are unresolved questions as to how
the state should apply Johnson’s strict scrutiny standard to the issue of
racially segregating inmates.354 In one respect, North Dakota has specifically laid out the rights of the warden to maintain order with “all necessary
means,” and the Attorney General affirmatively has indicated that there is
no single rule governing the maintenance of order in correctional
facilities.355 On the other hand, the state has codified that inmates shall not
be subjected to racial discrimination.356 Unlike California, North Dakota
has not adopted a policy of racially segregating its inmates.357
If any instances of racial segregation were to arise, the application of
strict scrutiny, as opposed to the reasonably related standard, might have
little effect.358 In either instance, the court would likely evaluate the claim
on a case-by-case basis, examining the circumstances that led to the
segregation.359 As stated in Hampson v. Satran,360 North Dakota might

350. State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 363 (N.D. 1995).
351. 537 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1995).
352. State ex rel. Schuetzle, 537 N.W.2d at 363.
353. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see also Burke v. N.D. Dep’t of
Corr. and Rehab., 2000 ND 85, ¶ 5, 609 N.W.2d 729, 731 (stating that if a prison regulation is
reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, then the court will not strike down the
regulation).
354. See Brief for the State of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21,
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636) (stating that there is ongoing debate
among prison officials nationwide as to the best method of reducing racial violence in prisons).
355. See id. (arguing that there is no single rule to apply to all prisons nationwide).
356. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44.1-14 (2005); see United Hosp. v. D’Annunzio, 514 N.W.2d
681, 684 (N.D. 1994) (stating that the court will construe statutory language in light of the
legislature’s intent when the text is ambiguous).
357. Reply Brief at 1, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636), 2004 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
579.
358. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 547-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the CDC’s
policy likely will pass the strict scrutiny standard because all states have a compelling interest in
maintaining order and internal security within their prisons); Chemerinsky, supra note 315, at 76
(indicating that the Johnson ruling might only have an effect on factually similar cases).
359. See, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 629-30 (N.D. 1977) (holding that a statute
mandating that female prisoners be transported to another state was violative of the inmates’
constitutional civil rights, but if there had been no adverse effects to the prisoners from the
transfer, then no constitutional deprivation would have occurred).
360. 319 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1982).
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look to the circumstances of the inmate’s conduct and the inmate’s impact
on the safety of other inmates and corrections officials.361 If the safety of
other inmates and prison staff were a concern, perhaps the court would
place greater emphasis on the use of inmate solitary confinement.362 Since
North Dakota has not applied a segregative policy to inmate housing, the
Johnson ruling will likely have minimal impact in housing North Dakota
inmates.363
V. CONCLUSION
In Johnson v. California, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
racial discrimination in penal institutions falls under a strict scrutiny standard of review.364 The Court found that Turner’s reasonableness standard
was inapplicable because it would permit rank discrimination.365 While the
Court determined that racial segregation in prisons must be evaluated under
a strict scrutiny standard, the Court did not decide whether the CDC’s
policy was constitutional.366 Instead, the Court remanded the case for
review by the lower court.367 Because the Court did not decide whether the
CDC’s policy was constitutional under strict scrutiny, it is unknown what
segregative policies, if any, meet strict scrutiny.368 Nor is it known whether
specialized circumstances, such as social unrest among prisoners, would
justify racially segregating cells.
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361. Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796, 798 (N.D. 1982).
362. See Havener v. Glaser, 251 N.W.2d 753, 760 (N.D. 1977) (reasoning that there are
circumstances when a warden must act quickly, based upon conclusions from his experience as a
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